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This chapter examines the challenge posed to the continuing relevance in Latin America of international refugee law – broadly construed – by forced displacement across borders as a result of organised crime. The 
protection needs of the victims of this displacement − the ‘new displaced’ – are 
only just being recognised. Yet, although a small body of literature exists on 
how the refugee law of North American countries such as the United States of 
America engages with this new form of displacement,1 little has been written 
on the relevance of refugee law as applied in Latin America. By examining how 
the well-established existing body of Latin American refugee law pertains to the 
new displaced, and then reviewing certain important recent developments in 
this area, the chapter seeks to contribute a new perspective to this field of study.
Refugee law in Latin America and the ‘new displaced’
The challenges involved in determining whether the new displaced qualify as 
refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol (Refugee Convention) are largely the same for Latin America 
as for North America.2 However, two particularities of the application of 
the Refugee Convention are relevant to note: 1) most Latin American States 
do not apply the concept of ‘internal flight alternative’; and 2) some States, 
1 In addition to Reynolds, chapter 8, see M.J. Lister, ‘Gang-related asylum claims: an overview 
and prescription’, University of Memphis Law Review, 38 (2008), 827−52; L.M. Harris and 
M.M. Weibel, ‘Matter of S-E-G-: the final nail in the coffin for gang-related asylum claims?’, 
Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, 20 (2010), 5−30; G. Cheng, ‘Gang persecution as grounds 
for asylum in the US’, Forced Migration Review, 37 (2011), 50−1; J. Racine, ‘Youth resistant 
to gang recruitment as a particular social group in Larios v. Holder’, British Columbia Third 
World Law Journal, 31 (2013), 457−72; K.M. Manuel, ‘Asylum and gang violence: a legal 
overview’, background paper for the US Congressional Research Service (2014).
2 For an analysis of the issues in relation to refugee law as applied in the United States of 
America, please see Reynolds, chapter 8. For a more general analysis of the profiles of such 
applicants and the applicable legal criteria, see N. Rodríguez Serna, ‘Fleeing cartels and 
maras: international protection considerations and profiles from the Northern Triangle’, 
International Journal of Refugee Law (forthcoming 2016).
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particularly in Central America, recognise gender-based persecution as an 
additional ground of refugee status.3 In view of the geographical and gendered 
dynamics of displacement due to organised crime,4 particularly within Central 
America, this suggests a stronger legal basis for protection in these States than 
in North America.5
However, there are additional bases for asylum in Latin America that are 
absent from North America. Although the political asylum framework has little 
relevance to the new displaced, the expanded refugee definition of the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees – based on the concept of a serious public 
order disturbance that threatens a person’s life, safety or freedom – represents 
an important potential source of protection.6 Expanded refugee definitions 
inspired by the Cartagena Declaration are currently found in the national 
legislation of 14 Latin American States, including many of those neighbouring 
countries affected by serious dynamics of organised criminal violence.7
Until recently, there has been no direct analysis of whether the Cartagena 
definition applies to situations of violence rooted in organised criminality.8 
Nonetheless, there can be no conceptual or principled objection to such 
application. It is clear from the terms of the expanded definition that its 
‘situational’ element requires only that a minimum intensity of public order 
3 See, for example, Argentinian Law no. 26165 (28 Nov. 2006), Art 53, Costa Rican 
Decree 36831-G (28 Sept. 2011), Art 13, El Salvadorian Law no. 918 (14 Aug. 2002), 
Art 4(a), Guatemalan Governmental Accord no. 383-2001 (14 Sept. 2011), Art 11(d), 
Honduran Decree 208-2003 (3 March 2004), Art 42(3)(e), Mexican Law on Refugees 
and Complementary Protection (27 Jan. 2011), Art 13(1), Nicaraguan Law no. 655 (20 
June 2008), Art. 1A, Panamanian Decree 23/98 (10 Feb. 1998), Art. 5(2), Paraguayan 
Law no. 1938 (9 July 2002), Art 1(a), Uruguayan Law no. 18076 (14 Nov. 2006), Art 2A, 
Venezuelan Organic Law on Refugees and Asylees (3 Oct. 2001), Art 5.
4 See D.J. Cantor, ‘The new wave: forced displacement caused by organized criminal groups in 
Central America and Mexico’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33 (2014), 34−68.
5 Note, however, that the United States of America (USA) remains by far the principal 
country of destination for asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle of Central America 
countries and Mexico, at least in terms of the numbers of asylum applications recorded as 
registered. Taking the example of asylum applications by El Salvador nationals in 2014, the 
only Latin American countries that registered more than 100 applications were Nicaragua 
(105), Costa Rica (303) and Mexico (418). By contrast, the USA registered 10,093 asylum 
applications that year from El Salvador nationals (UNHCR (2015) Global Trends 2014: 
World at War (Geneva), Annex, Table 12). 
6 1984 Cartagena Declaration, Conclusion 3.
7 These are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Ecuadorian legislation 
was changed in 2012 to remove reference to the broadened definition in the Cartagena 
Declaration, although the Constitutional Court of Ecuador recently reinstated the Cartagena 
definition as applicable in Ecuadorian national law.
8 See, however, the discussion below concerning the approach recommended by the recent 
2014 Brazil Declaration.
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disturbance be reached by the violence.9 Indeed, the definition appears almost 
tailor-made for ‘grey’ situations of violence for which characterisation in legal 
or political terms may be challenging.10 In the alternative,11 specific situations 
of organised criminality may easily be characterised as ‘generalised violence’, 
‘massive violation of human rights’ and/or (if the criteria of international 
humanitarian law are applied) ‘internal conflicts’.
Of course, the fact that the situational element of the Cartagena definition 
may in principle be met by serious criminal violence of the kinds currently 
affecting parts of Latin America is not sufficient to make all persons from those 
countries ‘refugees’. It is also required that the definition’s second element (that 
of ‘threat’ as a result of the situation) be met.12 As such, it may be the case that 
certain at-risk sectors of the population in areas where the organised criminal 
groups operate will have a prima facie claim to protection as refugees under the 
Cartagena definition. The importance of that protection is heightened because 
a number of Latin American States have not yet incorporated the human rights 
law-based principle of non-refoulement into their domestic legislation.13
Building on the Cartagena Declaration, the 2004 Mexico Declaration and 
Plan of Action (MPA) establishes a mechanism for the resettlement of Latin 
American refugees, specifically Colombians, from countries of first asylum, 
such as Ecuador, to other countries in the region.14 The scheme exists alongside 
‘traditional’ resettlement of this population to North America and other 
9 In short, the final situation referred to by the Cartagena definition − ‘circumstances which 
have seriously disturbed public order’ − is actually the core concept of which the preceding 
four situations are merely factual examples. For further detail on this argument, see D.J. 
Cantor and D. Trimiño Mora, ‘A simple solution to war refugees? The Latin American 
expanded definition and its relationship to IHL’, in D.J. Cantor and J.F. Durieux (eds.), 
Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law (Leiden, 2014).
10 This was certainly the case for the forms of violence in Central America in the 1980s that 
prompted the creation of the Cartagena definition.
11 In other words, if the attempt is instead made to define in legal terms each of the five 
elements individually, as per H. Gros Espiell, S. Picado and L. Valladares Lanza, ‘Principles 
and criteria for the protection of and assistance to Central American refugees, returnees and 
displaced persons in Latin America’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2 (1990), 83−117.
12 I have argued elsewhere that this element should be understood as referring to the ability 
of the putative refugee to live a dignified life (see D.J. Cantor, ‘Post hoc comments: expert 
meeting on the “Interpretation of the expanded refugee definition included in the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees”, Montevideo – Uruguay, 15−16 October 2013’, 
available at www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/ES.K001051.1/outputs/read/cbd41ea2-730c-
4a84-8b67-6669479ea438 (accessed 31 March 2014). If the inability to do so is as a result 
of the situation of violent disorder – i.e. rather than poverty etc. – then the definition will be 
met.
13 Moreover, the forms of harm addressed by the Cartagena definition are broader than those 
envisaged by the non-refoulement norms in provisions such as Article 3 of the Convention 
against Torture.
14 See, for example, W. Spindler,‘The Mexico Plan of Action: protecting refugees through 
international solidarity’, Forced Migration Review, 24 (2005), 64−5.
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countries in the global north. Regional burden-sharing has also implicitly been 
facilitated by the extension of the free movement principle among member 
States of MERCOSUR,15 which has facilitated the ‘resettlement’ of Colombians 
through migratory routes rather than via those of international protection.
Identifying challenges and future opportunities: 2014 
San Salvador expert workshop
Existing law provides a sufficient framework for Latin American States to 
accord international protection on a unilateral basis to the new displaced; and 
it likely requires them to do so in a proportion of cases where the threat to 
the person is well-founded. From the standpoint of law, there is no reason 
why this should not take place. However, resistance to the application of these 
frameworks may derive instead from several quarters. 
A first is a failure to appreciate the scale and nature of the problem. Although 
the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
is seeking to raise its profile in the region, the risk persists that Latin American 
States continue to perceive the problem as an issue of mere isolated criminality 
or a security issue and thus not a humanitarian issue. However, at least in 
certain countries, the scale of organised criminality and its humanitarian and 
even political impact are extreme. These are the core contemporary dynamics 
of violence in Latin America and the new displaced have a serious need for 
protection that will sometimes be outside their countries.
A second concerns the spread of the external migration of new displaced 
within the region. It is a fact that the patterns of internal and external 
displacement are quite diverse.16 Whereas some of the new displaced direct 
their flight out of the region – particularly towards North America and, to 
a lesser extent, Europe – others simply cross a border into a neighbouring 
State. The issue for some States thus becomes one of receiving a considerably 
larger number of such persons than others in the region by mere virtue of their 
geographical location, thus providing a ground for potential resentment.
Yet there may thus be benefit in seeking new multilateral approaches to 
the problem within the region. One potential basis for such collaboration 
is a common interest among States in responding to the violence and its 
consequences for their populations in view of the fact that it emanates to a 
15 MERCOSUR is the Spanish acronym for the Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of 
the South), an international organisation comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, with Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru among its associate 
members. 
16 In relation to Central America and Mexico, see Cantor, ‘The new wave’.
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large extent from non-State actors.17 This is in sharp contrast to the violence 
and displacement of the 1980s, in which States were also key perpetrators and 
divided by strong political differences but yet still managed to adopt and abide 
by joint principles in their treatment of refugees.
In this context, and with one eye on the upcoming Cartagena Declaration’s 
30th anniversary commemorations, I put forward several proposals at the 
Refugee Law Initiative (RLI)/Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón 
Cañas (UCA) expert workshop in San Salvador, El Salvador, at which this 
paper was originally presented in May 2014. Specifically, it was suggested that 
it would be appropriate to canvass and reinvigorate States’ commitments to 
refugee protection through unilateral and joint action. Possible collaborative 
policy responses to be explored in responding to the new displaced included 
the following burden-sharing mechanisms and protection tools:
• A reworking of the MPA framework − which is presently overly 
burdensome, slow and small-scale, as well as being limited to 
Colombians – to increase its utility and also include other groups of 
those newly displaced by organised crime.
• An exploration of the extent to which regional migration agreements 
in contexts other than MERCOSUR could be tweaked to allow 
for ‘resettlement’ of new displaced. A particular emphasis could 
be placed on the examination of how this operates in relation to 
persons with dual nationality, as is the case for a sector of the relevant 
populations in affected countries.
• A revival of the ‘humanitarian rescue’ schemes that operated in 
the 1970s and 1980s directly from certain countries of origin as a 
means of providing urgent protection and also ‘managing’ the most 
acute parts of the exodus to as far an extent as possible.18 This could 
involve global resettlement alongside that within the region of Latin 
America.
Finally, although acknowledging every effort must be made to preserve the 
institution of asylum, I argue that it is clear this needs to be accompanied 
by direct efforts to improve the humanitarian response within many affected 
countries. At least at present, it is evident that more people displace internally 
as a result of organised criminal violence than leave the country. In this context, 
the focus on internal displacement promoted by the 1994 San José Declaration 
on Refugees and Displaced Persons may take on a renewed significance.19 These 
17 Of course, this is not to suggest that State officials or institutions in these scenarios never 
collude or have other relationships with organised crime.
18 This approach to asylum correlates with the second of the three asylum paradigms identified 
by J.F. Durieux, ‘Three asylum paradigms’, International Journal of Minority and Group 
Rights, 20 (2013), 147−77.
19 See, particularly, 1994 San José Declaration, Conclusions 6, 14, 16−23.
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recommendations were reflected in the report and recommendations adopted 
by the 2014 RLI/UCA San Salvador expert workshop.20
Emerging engagement by governments: Cartagena+30 
process
The question of regional cooperation on ensuring international protection 
for persons displaced by organised crime was first substantively considered by 
Latin American governments in the 30th anniversary commemorations of the 
Cartagena Declaration. This series of events – named ‘Cartagena+30’ – was 
developed largely by UNHCR with the support of Latin American (and, to 
a lesser extent, Caribbean) governments. The aim of the process was to build 
on the Cartagena framework, as advanced by previous ten-year declarations 
and plans of action. This was so as to respond to the coming decade’s strategic 
challenges and to strategically advance the work of the region towards persons 
in need of international protection, including refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs).21
The diversity of refugee challenges experienced across Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC) led to governments holding a series of sub-regional 
consultative meetings prior to the plenary event in Brazil in December 2014.22 
These consultations were also organised in the MERCOSUR bloc countries 
(Buenos Aires, Argentina, 18−19 March 2014), the Andean countries (Quito, 
Ecuador, 9−10 June 2014), the countries of Mesoamerica (Managua, Nicaragua, 
10−11 July) and those of the Caribbean (10−11 September 2014). Each sub-
regional meeting was designed to engage with the refugee protection challenges 
particular to those countries and to produce a series of recommendations to be 
transmitted for consideration by LAC governments in order to agree a text for 
the declaration and plan of action in the final plenary event in Brazil.23
The issue of displacement generated by organised crime was first raised 
within the Mesoamerica sub-regional consultation in Managua, which was 
attended by the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and, as observers, 
Brazil and Cuba. Indeed, the discussion document produced by UNHCR for 
20 See RLI/UCA (2014) ‘Memorias: Los Grupos Criminales Organizados y la Nueva 
Ola de Desplazamiento Forzado en América Latina’, Taller de Expertos, Universidad 
Centroamericana ‘José Simeón Canas’, San Salvador, El Salvador, 22−23 May 2014.
21 UNHCR (2014) ‘Cartagena+30: documento conceptual’ (updated Jan. 2014). 
22 Parallel processes of consultation with civil society in these sub-regions were also organised 
by UNHCR. Representatives of civil society and academia (including me) also attended the 
governmental sub-regional consultations.
23 The discussions that followed the sub-regional consultations took place largely in Geneva 
through the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries in the United Nations 
(GRULAC). 
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the Managua consultation made specific reference to ‘transnational organised 
crime and other situations of violence’ as key among the ‘new trends of forced 
displacement’ in that sub-region and one which presented a number of pressing 
protection challenges.24 
Indeed, within the Managua sub-regional consultation, the first substantive 
panel comprised presentations devoted to the ‘Desafíos de protección ante las 
nuevas tendencias del desplazamiento forzado por motivos relacionados con el 
crimen organizado trasnacional y otras formas de violencia en Mesoamérica’ 
[Protection challenges concerning the new trends of forced displacement for 
reasons related to transnational organised crime and other forms of violence in 
Mesoamerica]. I was invited to join this panel in order to present the principal 
conclusions and recommendations from the 2014 RLI/UCA San Salvador 
expert workshop to the governments in attendance.25 They were as follows:26
1. It is important to understand that in some countries in the region 
displacement caused by organized crime is a humanitarian problem that 
has reached critical levels, which makes it necessary to formulate common 
responses by establishing a regional framework of shared protection. 
Under this concept, countries maintain a degree of responsibility towards 
individuals displaced by criminal violence both if they are their nationals – 
regardless of whether they have been internally or externally displaced – or 
if they are foreigners in their country.
This approximation allows the establishment of initiatives for solidarity that 
include both countries of origin and those of reception, without excluding 
any part and without carrying any judgment. As a result, it is essential to 
identify the strengths of each of the participating States and institutions to 
allow each of them to make a contribution towards the protection of people 
in their charge and the construction of a common system.
2. The first step towards developing this system is unifying approximations 
to the phenomenon of ‘organized criminal violence’ with the aim of 
establishing common criteria that allow a common starting point to 
understand this phenomenon and the formulation of joint strategies. An 
essential part of this component is identifying the methodological gaps of 
current approximations with the aim of crafting common indicators.
24 UNHCR (2014) ‘Documento de Discusión: proceso conmemorativo del trigésimo 
aniversario de la declaración de Cartagena’, Cartagena+30, reunión subregional de 
Mesoamérica, July 2014.
25 The other participants on the panel were: Yolanda del Carmen Perez Molina, subsecretary 
of social inclusion for the Secretary of State, Human Rights, Justice, Interior and 
Decentralization Office of Honduras; Liduvina Magarín, vice minister for Salvadorian 
Nationals Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador; Werner Vargas, executive 
director of the Central American Integration System.
26 D.J. Cantor, ‘Organised crime and the new challenges for refugee law in Latin America’ 
(2014), paper presented at Mesoamerican sub-regional meeting of States for Cartagena+30, 
Managua, Nicaragua, 9 July 2014; see also RLI/UCA, ‘Memorias’, conclusiones y 
recomendaciones.
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Likewise, it should be understood that violence has a direct impact on the 
lives of individuals who are not involved with organized crime and that it 
does not allow them to live their lives in peace. In that sense, it is necessary 
that there are indicators that allow the integral application of protection 
policies towards them. One example of that approximation is avoiding 
the construction of excessively technical definitions and pushing for the 
identification of victims through geographical indicators – related to violence 
in their region of origin – and their objective experience of abandoning their 
homes. This would enable the authorities to respond efficiently and identify 
the population’s needs even when it has not yet requested protection.
3. Parallel to this conceptual effort it is necessary to develop as soon as 
possible a registration instrument to measure the levels and dynamics of 
displacement as well as general information of the target population, which 
should also be comparable and widely used both in regions of origin and those 
of reception. This registry, following protocols to anonymize information on 
individual cases to protect the identity of displaced individuals, can operate 
at several levels; for instance, it can unify information taken from registries 
on homes that have been abandoned, of direct victims of common crime 
when this has forced them to leave their countries and a specific registry on 
displacement.
In reception countries asylum claims are an indicator of this phenomenon 
but they are not a perfect indicator, as claims can be rejected for other reasons 
without denying that displacement has occurred; on the other hand, it is 
also possible that in many cases people do not report their displacement but 
instead seek other forms of migration regularisation or consular assistance, 
which means that these mechanisms should also develop protocols to 
register displacement.
4. All this information can then be compiled and consolidated in a wider 
information system, either using existing systems like SICA [the Sistema de 
Integración Centroamericana − Central American Integration System], or a 
new regional observatory. The objective of this system is to serve as a source 
of information for local authorities and international partners and in this 
way support the development of well-informed public policies that respond 
to real needs.
In particular, the establishment of this registry is essential in order to create 
measures to protect dispossessed property and the integrity of inhabitants 
who have stayed behind.
5. Additionally, and as a part of the acknowledgment that this violence is 
a common problem and of the shared responsibility towards its victims, 
affected States and the legal community in countries of reception should 
strive to ensure that systems for international protection adequately reflect 
the gravity of the situation in the countries of origin and that they grant 
international protection in an impartial, professional and efficient manner 
when due.
6. Existing mechanisms should be taken full advantage of, and lessons 
should be learned from past experiences to make this process more effective, 
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including the Central American experience in the Cartagena Process on 
refugees and the San José Declaration.
For instance, initiatives on regional citizenship and mobility like 
MERCOSUR can be used to provide immediate possibilities for 
relocalisation and local integration of forced migrants, but it is essential 
to avoid that they are used to hide the needs of individuals who deserve 
international protection. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that 
the decision to request international protection or pursue mechanisms for 
migratory regularisation should rest on the individual, and that in this 
process he or she should be able to count on the States’ support to be able to 
clearly understand the implications of this decision. 
7. The construction of an integral policy should not detract attention from 
the importance of developing immediate responses to the most urgent 
humanitarian needs, of developing preventive policies to avoid more 
displacement in the future and of applying preservation measures to protect 
the life and property of displaced populations. In particular, it is necessary to 
develop and implement emergency plans that avoid the usual length of time 
behind public policies, which usually take several years to be formulated and 
made operational. In this sense, a mechanisms that can be used effectively is 
the system for humanitarian evacuation, which allows State institutions to 
facilitate agile and immediate evacuations of high-risk profiles towards safe 
third countries.
These emergency plans should not be isolated, but instead they should 
be able to permeate local institutions and influence the development of 
coherent and systematic national policies in the long term.
8. This process should continue to be open to frank and cooperative dialogue 
between the different actors involved in the issue, in particular governments, 
academia, international organisations and humanitarian agencies, with the 
aim of seeking solutions from a multidisciplinary perspective.
Beyond these groups’ intervention, there must be an effort to ensure the 
participation of displaced individuals and refugees both in the construction 
of urgent measures and long-term policies to enable them to share their 
opinions and have a central role in this process.
In summary, the presentation argued that, although Mesoamerica is not 
the only part of the world whose citizens are displaced by organised crime, it 
is the only region that has the foresight, creativity and opportunity to take the 
first steps to respond to the humanitarian needs of persons displaced by all 
regions’ common enemy of organised crime.27 In developing a marco regional 
de protección compartida [regional framework of shared protection] for these 
vulnerable persons, it suggested that the region may once again offer the world 
a model as inspiring as that of the original Cartagena Declaration.28
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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This input from the 2014 RLI/UCA expert workshop was largely reflected in 
the ‘Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations’ adopted by governments 
present at the Managua sub-regional consultation.29 The relevant part of the 
document is reproduced here in full in order to demonstrate the complete 
scope of the recommendations adopted by Mesoamerican governments on this 
issue in Managua:
The sub-regional consultation made the following recommendations to 
address this phenomenon within a framework of close regional cooperation: 
1. Highlight the fact that displacement caused by organized crime in 
Mesoamerica is a complex problem that must be addressed with a focus on 
human rights, responsibility sharing and solidarity. Regardless of whether 
people move within their countries or across international borders and 
recognize that, in the latter case, it can lead to the recognition of refugee 
status. 
2. Confront the causes generating forced displacement in the region with 
the cooperation of States, civil society and international organisations, 
within a framework of responsibility sharing. 
3. Develop an early warning system for displacement within SICA. 
4. In the framework of the cooperation agreement signed between SICA 
and UNHCR, consider the creation of an Observatory of human rights for 
the migrant population subjected to forced displacement, with the active 
participation of civil society and Academia and the support and supervision 
of the Human Rights Ombudsmen at regional level. The aim would be 
to implement a common system of collection and analysis of quantitative 
and qualitative information on the phenomenon, which will facilitate the 
formulation of public policies and regional coordination and cooperation. 
5. Develop a comprehensive regional policy for addressing forced 
displacement and provide assistance to victims with the support of 
international cooperation, without prejudice to the adoption of immediate 
national responses. 
6. Prepare a harmonized registration Protocol to measure the levels of forced 
displacement and information for the displaced population. 
7. Strengthen the work of existing networks within the States, international 
organisations and civil society to address the issue of forced displacement, 
focusing on border monitoring, with the participation of national 
institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
8. Consider the establishment of a regional mechanism of humanitarian 
evacuation to third countries, defining the criteria for their beneficiaries and 
the modalities of cooperation. 
29 ‘Resumen de conclusiones y recomendaciones’, Consulta Subregional de Mesoamérica 
‘Desafíos de la Protección Internacional y Oportunidades para un Nuevo Marco Estratégico 
de Cooperación Regional’ (2014), Cartagena+30, reunión subregional de Mesoamérica, 
Managua, 10−11 July 2014, Part II.
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9. Strengthen national judicial systems and other national protection 
mechanisms, such as victims and witnesses protection programs. 
10. Influence the authorities of the host countries of migrants or people who 
need asylum or international protection as refugees and a regional visa, in 
order to ease and streamline response mechanisms to applications originated 
by situations of violence. 
11. Take into account UNHCR’s guidance notes for refugee applications 
filed by victims of gangs or maras. 
12. Promote a permanent regional forum of commissions of refugee 
status determination [RSD] for the exchange of good practices within the 
framework of SICA and find its connection with the Regional Conference 
on Migration (RCM), the Central American Court of Justice and other 
similar forums in Latin America. 
13. Include the networks of civil society within SICA’s Consultative 
Committee framework.
Through the Cartagena+30 process, these recommendations were 
transmitted to the plenary of LAC governments to consider and debate with 
a view to feeding into the eventual agreed text for the 2014 Brazil Declaration 
and Plan of Action. It can be seen that many of the key points reflect those 
proposed by the 2014 RLI/UCA expert workshop. 
A novel framework: 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of 
Action
The material outcome of the Cartagena+30 process was the successful adoption 
by LAC governments of the envisaged declaration and plan of action in a final 
plenary meeting in Brasilia, Brazil, on 3 December 2014.30 This framework was 
named the 2014 ‘Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action’ in recognition of Brazil’s 
generous hosting of the conference and its important contribution to financing 
the process overall. It represents the next step of elaboration upon the regional 
principles agreed in the Cartagena Declaration in 1984. However, it is also 
important since it constitutes the first ever multilateral and intergovernmental 
acknowledgment of the need to respond to the humanitarian challenges of 
forced displacement generated by organised criminal groups.
The Brazil Declaration, effectively a principled preamble to adoption of 
the Brazil Plan of Action, makes merely passing reference to this new form 
of forced displacement. It does so explicitly only in a statement that the LAC 
governments:
recognize the existence of new challenges regarding international protection 
for some countries of the region that need to continue making progress in 
30 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, 3 Dec. 2014.
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the application of the regional extended refugee definition, thus responding 
to the new international protection needs caused, among others, by 
transnational organised crime.31
The focus of this paragraph is upon the use of the expanded refugee definition 
contained in the Cartagena Declaration. As such, the reference to organised 
crime as a cause of displacement is intended to emphasise the need to carefully 
consider developing the use of this extended definition as a means of responding 
to these new international protection challenges in practice. 
Even so, the Declaration’s framing of the issue in terms of ‘transnational’ 
organised crime is unhelpful, since the ‘transnational’ character of such groups 
is not routinely apparent or relevant to the generation of displacement in 
many of the pertinent Latin American contexts. Indeed, the inclusion of the 
adjective ‘transnational’ likely reflects the fact that international law dealing 
with combating organised crime tends to focus on that which has readily-
identifiable transnational aspects and thus call for international regulation and 
cooperation, as in the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its Protocols.32 However, the need for national or 
international protection in the context of displacement by organised criminal 
groups in Latin America does not depend on any transnational aspect to 
these groups but rather on the extent to which they use violence against local 
populations.33
Later in the Declaration, the reference to ‘transnational organised crime’ 
is supplemented by a statement concerning the displacement of persons from 
the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA) countries, in which the 
assembled governments:
Recognize that, owing to a multiplicity of causes, the displacement of 
persons … forced to escape from their community of origin constitutes a 
new challenge in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, and highlight[s] 
the importance of promoting shared but differentiated responsibility among 
the States of origin, transit and destination.34
The statement is rather oblique in that the element of organised crime as a 
factor that generates forced displacement in these countries is not specifically 
mentioned. However, this paragraph serves to set up closer consideration of the 
issue in the Brazil Plan of Action. Yet it does so by limiting the analysis of this 
31 Brazil Declaration, 2.
32 See, in particular, its 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children and its 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air.
33 See, for example, the various chapters in this volume dedicated to describing the nature 
of organised criminal groups in Latin America and their involvement in generating forced 
displacement in the relevant countries.
34 Ibid.
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topic to the countries of the NTCA, thereby obscuring the existence of these 
trends in other countries of the region such as Mexico and Colombia. Even 
so, the paragraph remains important in terms of the response to be adopted, 
which is defined by reference to a newly proclaimed principle of ‘shared but 
differentiated responsibility’.
This analysis is confirmed by the manner in which the issue of displacement 
in the NTCA is framed by the Brazil Plan of Action, that is: 
In the Northern Triangle of Central America, displacement was observed 
of persons forced to escape their community of origin due to, among 
other causes, transnational organised crime. In particular, there has been 
a significant increase in the numbers of Guatemalan, Honduran and 
Salvadoran citizens who leave their countries in search for international 
protection or who are displaced internally owing to security reasons.35
In other words, the Plan of Action characterises the NTCA as a sub-region 
affected by increased displacement, of which the only named cause is 
‘transnational organised crime’. Whereas it is clear that the predominant 
concern in this sub-region is displacement caused by organised crime, similarly 
this form of displacement is framed as being confined only to these NTCA 
countries.
The characterisation of the NTCA displacement dynamics as generated by 
organised crime is wholly apparent in the framework provided by the Plan 
of Action for responding to the protection needs of refugees and displaced 
persons in this sub-region. This framework is largely provided by Chapter Four 
of the Plan of Action, which is titled ‘Solidarity with the Northern Triangle of 
Central America in seeking and implementing durable solutions’. Reflecting the 
outcome of the Managua sub-regional consultation, this chapter recommends 
the establishment of three different programmes in the region to strengthen 
‘regional cooperation between States’.36 These programmes are intended to give 
practical effect to the Brazil Declaration principle of ‘shared but differentiated 
responsibility’.37
The Chapter Four programmes are quite distinct in their emphasis, 
although the extent to which they build upon the original RLI/UCA expert 
workshop proposals is interesting. Firstly, there is a programme to establish 
a Human Rights Observatory on Displacement within the framework of the 
Cooperation Agreement between SICA and the UNHCR.38 Its objective would 
be to set up a common system for analysing quantitative and qualitative data 
about displaced populations forced to leave their homes in Central America in 
35 Brazil Plan of Action, Chapter One.
36 Brazil Plan of Action, Chapter Four.
37 Ibid.
38 Chapter Four, the ‘Human Rights Observatory on Displacement’ programme. 
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order to help with formulating public policies and regional coordination and 
cooperation. It is envisaged as having an early warning and emergency response 
system for situations where there is a high risk of displacement. It is mandated 
also to conduct analyses of protection needs and identify trends and profiles 
for these groups.
Secondly, there is a ‘Prevention’ programme to strengthen national 
protection and assistance mechanisms for populations in vulnerable situations 
in the NTCA countries.39 It includes the following actions:
the design and implementation of protocols for the registration of victims 
and displaced persons; coordination between human rights institutions 
and the competent State agencies responsible for the welfare of children 
returned or deported and reunified with their families; the development 
and implementation of assistance programmes for victims of violence 
perpetrated by organised criminal groups; and the provision of training and 
increased human and financial resources for national institutions for the 
protection of women and children.40 
The focus of this programme is clearly on protection in the country of origin, 
such that its scope encompasses not only returnees but also, crucially, IDPs 
and those at risk of being displaced. The Plan of Action also encourages south‐
south and triangular cooperation schemes for implementing this programme, 
based on best practices and experiences of other countries of the region. To 
complement these actions, third party States are invited to contribute to 
funding the separate development initiative Plan Alliance for the Prosperity 
of the Northern Triangle, presented by the NTCA presidents to the United 
Nations.
Thirdly, within Chapter Four, there is also a ‘Dignified and Safe Transit’ 
programme, which seeks to improve access to differentiated and quality 
procedures for RSD.41 It also seeks to promote in border areas:
better understanding among people of their right to seek international 
protection; the training of border officials on national mechanisms for 
refugee status determination, particularly concerning accompanied and 
unaccompanied children; and a rights‐based approach that includes the 
design of procedures based on the best interests of the child.
This programme is clearly aimed at improving the procedural guarantees for 
international protection of persons fleeing from these causes in the NTCA, 
rather than for IDPs. Key to these efforts is also the intention to promote better 
understanding of the international protection needs of persons forced to leave 
their communities owing to the activities of organised crime. Towards this end, 
the programme also encompasses a commitment to disseminate and promote 
39 Chapter Four, the ‘Prevention’ programme.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, Chapter Four, the ‘Dignified and Safe Transit’ programme.
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use of the UNHCR ‘Guidance note on refugee claims relating to victims of 
organized gangs’.42 
Given that the substance of the programme relates largely to the sufficiency 
of procedures for determining the need for international protection, the 
emphasis on safe and dignified ‘transit’ in the title of the programme is 
interesting. It may reflect a tacit acknowledgment that some of those NTCA 
nationals encountered outside their country and found by other NTCA States 
or Mexico to require international protection will ultimately move on towards 
the north. However, no doubt due to the politics surrounding these patterns 
of mobility in Central and North America, there is nothing in the actions 
recommended by the programme that speaks directly to the particular need of 
refugees and asylum-seekers in transit.
Finally, it is important to note that in the separate chapter of the Brazil 
Plan of Action relating to ‘Comprehensive, Complementary and Sustainable 
Solutions’, adjustments are proposed to the Latin American regional ‘Solidarity 
Resettlement’ programme, established by the 2004 MPA. These include the 
call to take specific action to: 
(b) Identify current and mid‐term priority situations that may require the 
support of the “Solidarity Resettlement” programme. In this respect, the 
following actions are proposed as expressions of solidarity and cooperation:
… ii. Cooperate with the three countries of the Northern Triangle given 
their vulnerability to the activities of transnational organized crime.43
In other words, the intention expressed in the Brazil Plan of Action is to 
consider using the regional resettlement programme, particularly operated by 
the MERCOSUR countries as a means of resettling vulnerable cases of persons 
fleeing organised crime in the NTCA.
In practical terms, the programmes proposed by the Brazil Plan of Action 
to address forced displacement by organised crime are ambitious and it is 
likely that challenges lie ahead in securing their implementation by the NTCA 
governments and others in the region. This impression was not dismissed by the 
Seminario de Planificación held at the Institute of International Humanitarian 
Law (IIHL) San Remo, Italy, in March 2015, in order to discuss ‘La Declaración 
y el Plan de Acción de Brasil: el reto de su implementación’.44 Nonetheless, in 
relation to Chapter Four of the Brazil Plan of Action, the San Remo meeting 
did at least manage to set out a number of options for the implementation of 
these three NTCA programmes.45 
42 UNHCR, ‘Guidance note on refugee claims relating to victims of organized gangs’ (2011).
43 Ibid, Chapter Three, the ‘Solidarity Resettlement’ programme.
44 IIHL, ‘Informe final’, Seminario de Planificación ‘La Declaración y el Plan de Acción de 
Brasil: el reto de su implementación’ (2015), San Remo, 4–7 March 2015.
45 Ibid, Chapter Four, pp. 7−8.
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Yet, whatever the challenges that await in terms of practical implementation, 
at the conceptual level the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action do 
still represent a significant milestone in their development of a framework for 
responding to the protection needs of persons displaced by organised crime 
in the region. Firstly, there is the express recognition of the real protection 
needs generated by these new forms of displacement. Secondly, there is a strong 
indication as to the positive applicability of the Cartagena expanded refugee 
definition to these scenarios. Thirdly, a regional approach beyond the affected 
countries is promoted that is rooted in the novel principle of proclaimed 
‘shared but differentiated responsibility’. Fourthly, specific programmes and 
actions are designed to implement this principle not only to meet international 
protection needs but also in relation to protection concerns in the context of 
internal displacement. 
There is little doubt that the issue of displacement due to organised crime 
constitutes one of the main and most pressing protection concerns behind 
the Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, nor that these documents seek 
to delineate a new approach to these problems in practice. Even so, the 
political nature of the Cartagena+30 process appears to have led to certain 
compromises. The most apparent is the decision to restrict acknowledgement 
of this form of displacement to the NTCA countries, when it is plainly present 
in other countries of Latin America. Similarly, it is unclear why the framework 
introduces an element of confusion by sometimes referring to the factor of 
organised crime as ‘transnational’. It remains to be seen whether these aspects 
will compromise the framework in its implementation through law, policy and 
practice. 
Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, refugee law as applied in Latin America remains 
relevant and largely legally sufficient to ensure that the ‘new displaced’, that is, 
persons fleeing from organised crime, receive international protection where 
it is needed. Indeed, for countries that apply the region’s extended refugee 
definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, petitions for refugee 
status by such persons should be relatively straightforward to resolve, especially 
in light of the encouragement given by the 2014 Brazil Declaration. Of 
course, a number of these same cases will also qualify equally under the refugee 
concept expressed by the Refugee Convention, at least as it is interpreted and 
implemented in many Latin American countries.
Nonetheless, the express acknowledgment by the 2014 Brazil Declaration 
and Plan of Action of the protection needs of the newly displaced remains very 
welcome. It straightforwardly reaffirms that such scenarios do generate a need 
for international protection and responds by creating a principled framework 
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of programmes and practical actions for facilitating access to protection where 
it is merited, whether in the country of origin or across a border. Rooted in the 
novel principle of ‘shared but differentiated responsibility’, Latin America has 
set out its roadmap for protecting refugees and IDPs fleeing from organised 
crime. Only the coming ten years will show whether Latin American States 
have the will and capability to provide the new displaced with protection in 
line with the principles of the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action. 
Nonetheless, a positive starting point has been made.
